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TARLF OF CONTFNTS 
,, I rflili l'J T'1F f_Ol·ffP UlllPT 
I I I I ' f S()I I ( ;wr () N App EAL 
RFrAUSF APPFLLANTS FAILEn TO MAKE A 
SPECIFIC OBJFCTION AT TRIAL TO THE 
AnMISSION OF THE EVJnENCE NOW CHALLENGED 
ON APPF:.AL, APPELLATF: REVIEW OF THF: 
AnMISSIRILTTY OF THAT EVIDF:NCF rs NOT 
AVAILARLF:; ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY DFNTFD APPELLANTS' MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE:. 
P<llNT I I THF: TRIAL COURT DID NOT E:RR IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS' RFOUEST FOR nISCUJ.SrJRP, OP THF: 
IllENTITY OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT; 
ALTF:RNATIVELY, F.l\I LIJRF TO RFOIJIRE 
OI.C:CLOSLJRF: WAS HARMU:ss •• 
Pll!NT TII llTAH CODE ANN."> 76-6-402(l)(l'l78) AND 
THE TRIAL COURT'S I'JSTRllCTION RASF:D ON 
THAT STATUTE ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND. 
f'rlINT IV THF JURY INSTRUCTION THAT POSSESSION OF 
PROPERTY RECENTLY STOLF:N, \'/HEN NO 
SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF SUCH 
PrJSSFSSJON IS MADE, SHALL RF DFF:MFD PRIMA 
FACIE EVIDENCE THAT THE PERSON IN 
P()SSESSION STOLP THE PROPERTY, DID NOT 
SHI FT THE BURDEN OF PERSIJASION TO 
APPFLLANTS, NOR nin IT CREATE AN 
IRRERUTTARLE PRESll'1PTION ••• 
i'11f NT V Tlffl~F: W.l\S SUFFICIENT EVIDF:NCF TO SUPPORT 
APl-'FLLl\'JTC:' criNvrrTI<lNS. 
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] 'I nn: <-;[IJ'Jil·''ff ('()IJf<T llF THF STATF: OF llTAH 
Plaint iff-RPc;pnnrl"'nt, 
Case No. 19151 
Case No. l'll52 
f",\lf'· 11. ("JIA'1HFPS, STANLEY Ne~n 
., ' ·, i1.1 '. f "; , Ci n1l J . I l • ( 1 as t n a rne 
11 ri ~ 11 1 1 wn) , 
nefenrla nts-Appel la nts.: 
STATEMFNT OF THF NATURF OF THE CASF 
Appellants, James Chamhers anrl Stanley Jacohsen, 
wen" chan:ied with hurglary, a second degree felony, unrler lltah 
r·n-1,, Ann. ~ 71'-n-2n2 ( 1978 l, anrl theft, a second rlegree 
tel•rny, unrlPr Utah Corle Ann. ~ 7n-ii-404 ( l'l7R). 
DISPOSITION IN THF LOWER COURT 
After a jury trial on March 8 and 9, 1983 in the 
H1 irrl .iudici al nistr ict Court in and for Summit County, the 
Hu1urahll' .I. Dennis Frerlerick, Judge, presiding, appellants 
-~""' .. "' f1iund guilty of hurgli'lry and theft. Both were sentenced 
t•J the rrt3h State Prison for a term of 1-15 years for the 
f•,r·m<"r offense and for a term of 1-15 years for the latter 
.,ffpnse, the sentences to run consecutively. 
PF[I FF srn.rGHT ON APPF:AL 
Ht_-':-~jl1'11'1Pnt c,1"1·f:s ;=in nnier of this Court affirming 
i 1tf'f1ri·--; ,\f th!-' tri.11 c<)lJrt. 
STATFMFNT n~ ~AC"TS 
Police net)nrtrn(•nt '..Jr•t1 t I 
that a hUrCdlat-y hCJ() takt'n [>lc°-J('!' 111 ti!(' ! 1 ar~ ('If\' ,-Jtl',J ,1r1•i t· 
he knew who hnrl cnm1ni t ted t ~1t-' ('l'l ITH'. 
stereos with speakers, 1Ji(iP(J c,1ssPttt~s, te}f!Visi(Jns, ,1nrl 
clothing were tcikpn in the hur<JL1ry (T. S'l). The infnnnCJnl 
then directed the officers to James ChArnhers's residence in 
Salt Lake City, which he ide>ntified as the home of the persnn• 
who had committed the crirne (T. 59-fiO, 110). 
The next night, pursuant tu arran<Jernents rnarle hy t 
informant, Detective Pirraglio, who pnserl as a prospective 
huyer, rnet with appellants anrl the informant at the 
informant's apartment (T. fi5-fi7l. Refore leaving the 
apartment tn examine merchanrlise in the trunk nf ilppellants' 
car, appellants checked for a police car they helieverl w,1s in 
the area (T. fi8). Appellants then tnok !tetective Pirragli() ,. 
the car and showed hini a VCR, which he suhsequently purdia.'"'' 
for s2nn ( T. fi'l-71). 
That sarne night, Richard Thompson returned to hi• 
Summit Park resirlenc,, 'lnti disrnvered that it hAd heen 
h u rg 1 a r i zed ( T . 1 3 ) . Aninn.J the items hP reported rnissin•.; 
a pistnl, anrl a pnir rif Tr,ny 
h't11 r• 11f ti r ._, 1 <...; tir r 1u ;f1 t t f • 
tn •11·. Th"'npsrrn's n,si-1Pnce, he was ahle to irlentify it as the 
()f1'-' iris'=>iny from his h<Jrne (T. 27). 
r_in ,Janu,-iry 10, l'lfl3, nfficers ,with a search warrant, 
1,, I Clirirnhers's resirlence and seizerl a pistol anrl a pair 
---wt•· 1 y t>'><1tc; (T. lOR-113) .. larnes <:hambers anrl Stanley 
la1 rd 1 sen, who was staying in the Chambers's home at the time 
IT. JSS, JRf;-JR7), were hoth present during the search (T. 
11 ll) • Al trial, Richarrl Thompson irlentified the pistol anrl 
hoots as those stolen frof'l his residPnce (T. 2'i-2fi). Thompson 
rlirl not know appellants anrl never gave thef'l permission to 
enter his home or to possess his personal helongings (T. 
24-2S). 
After a pretrial hearing on February 22, l'lR3, the 
trial court denierl appellants' motion to suppress evidence 
seizerl pursuant to the search warrant and their motion to 
require the state to rlisclose the irlentity of a confidential 
i nfrirmant ( R. 1113-104, 107-lOR), 
Roth appellants filed a notice of alihi (R. 87-RR, 
The alihi testif'lony presented at trial sought to 
~stahlish the whereahouts of appellants during the time period 
lh" crime woulrl have heen committed (T. l'i0-l'i7, 175-179). 
«11pPl !ants also presented evirlence in an effort to explain 
thPir possession of the VCR, the pistol, and the cowhoy boots 
IT. Jr,7-lSR, l'lfi-202). 
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AR\,llMFNT 
POINT I 
RF.CAITSF APPFTLl\NTS Fl\! LFfl Tn ~np· A 
SPFCI F!C OIUFCT!ClN AT TR!l\L. TCl THI·: 
AflMISSI r1N OF THr: Fl'] ilF'"C'' Nrl\'I l'HALl.FN1;F[' 
ON APPFAL, APPr:LLATF Rr' 11n:w rw THC' 
ADMISSI RI[, TTY rw THAT F\II IWNCf' JS N11T 
A\IAI LARLE; ALTFRNATIVFLY, THF TRI Al CrlllRT 
PROPFRLY flFNIF:fl APPF.LLANT.S' MOTTO'! TO 
SUPPRESS THF EVIDFNCF. 
Appellants contend that the denial of their prPtri 
motion to suppress the evirlence seized pursuant to the sc>arc> 
warrant was error. !Jnder Rule 4 of the Utah RulPs of F:virlen .. 
(1971), in effect at the time of appellants' trial, a specif: 
objection to the arlmission of evidence is required at trial 
even when a pretrial motion to suppress has been made; anrl tc,. 
ahsence of such an objection preclurles appellate review oft'· 
admissibility of the challenged evidence. State v. Lesley, 
Utah, fi72 P.2rl 7q, Rl-R2 ( 19R3). Appellants failerl to milke a 
specific, record objection at trial to the admission of the 
evidence whose admissibility they now challenge on appeal. 
Based on Lesley, the issue therefore has not been preserve·i 
for appeal. Furthermore, "the facts are not such that g1·1°..it 
and manifest injustice would be done if this Court rloes n0t 
entertain the issue sua sponte as an excepti0n." Lesley, r;',· 
P.2rl at 81-82, qu0ting State v. Pierce, Utah, fi55 P.2rl fi,r;, 
677(l'lR2). 
If, however, the Court is inr:linPd t(i a(lclt-(>--;s t~,, 
issue, appel lr.intc,' rin1u:ri.::int c;, ,"'trt-_, ,.,,it-hnut rnt-_·ri t. t"Jh (' !) t ~It 
-4-
t r 1 , i l >11r-t_ lt'nl f-'1l ,-ii 1 )H--' l lnnts' mot ir)n to suppress, which 
,ir1111~i! that thf_' affidavit supporting the search warrant WiiS 
1',11fticif"nt, thP 11riit0d Statt=:>s Suprl=?me Court hac4. not yet 
.,J itL; r)111nir)n in Illinois v. Gates, ll. s. 103 
I t , 0 l \ 7 ( ) '-l ft j ) • Tn reachinq its dPcision, the trial court 
ap;1lif'd the st-1nclarih set fcirth in l\guilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 
JrlR ()'-lfi4),anrl Spinelli v. United States, 3CJ3 lJ.S. 410 (lCJf>CJ). 
In ~es, the Supreme Court ahandoned its rigid "two-prongerl 
test" under Aguilar and Spinelli for determining whether an 
informant's tip estahlishes probable cause for issuance of a 
warLant, anrl suhstituted the traditional "totality of 
1:ircumstances test" in its place. Appellants concede that if 
the "totality of circu1'1stc;nces test" is applied in their case, 
the affidavit in support of the search warrant is sufficient. 
H11wc,ver, they argue that Gates should not apply because that 
,_-ase is to have prospective application only. They are 
,1ppan°ntly taking the position that Gates does not apply to 
cases, like theirs, where a search warrant was issued and 
,,x,-·cuteorl prior to the elate of the Supreme Court's decision. 
lk.;over, appellants cite no authority in support of this 
it ion .. 
Nowhere in the Gates op in ion is there even a 
su'J'lestion that the ruling is to have prospective application 
n11 l y. Numernus courts have applied the totality of the 
: I I•, r 1' ~ i r 1 j t h 1 • 
-S-
to Gates. 
1239, 1241-1244 (11th ('Jr. l 11C'1); l'11de 1 I 'lei\"' ___ '' 
1 n r ,-, I, t l r1 · ~ 
::-.t (1 t f 
Rose, Kan. App., fifi') P.:?d llll, llll-lllS (]llHC\l. 
Significantly, this \nurt in StatP v. Anrlertnn, 11ti'lh, r,r;R P.i'' 
125R ( lgR3) (an appPal which was penrlinci when GatPs was 
decidPd), did not hesitate to rely on Gates as prnvidinq 
"further support fnr the conclusion that prol>ahlP ceiu'''' 
existed for the issuanCP of the search warrant." Anrlerton, 
668 P.2d at 12SR. 
In suro, there is nothinq in Gates or the relevant 
decisions from this cinrl othPr JUrisrlictions to inrlicate th;it 
the totcility nf circumstcinces test shoulrl not apply to 
appellants' case. Tn the contrary, thn.c;e rlecisinns rni'lke cJ~.n 
that that test properly appli0s here. Therefore, as cnncerlc·' 
by arpellants, unrlPr the <,ates analysis, the> affidavit in 
support nf the search w,1rrant Wi'lS sufficient. 
- (-,-
P()INT II 
Till·' Till 1\l ('(lllPT DI fl N()T F:PR JN OF:NYIN\, 
·\[•!'Fl I ·\1'1c;' Rf'(JllF,c;T FilP nic;('LnSllPF: OP THF: 
ll'f'"JT!TY ()f THf: rn'lFTIWNTTAL TNFOR"1ANT; 
Al Tf'l<N•\TT'lfl v, F.1\1 !JlRF Tr> REClllTRP 
111.c;<1.nc;11pF, WAS HAPMLE<:;S. 
Thee trial court cl<0nied appC?llants' pretrial motion 
tn require? thEc> statP tn clisclose> thP idPnt i ty of the 
confidential informant who supplied inforriation to police 
officers in this case. l\ppellants clairi that this denied theri 
rlu0 process of law. They rely on language in State v. 
Forshee, Tltah, fill P.2rl 1222 (lqRn), to support this 
cone 1 us inn: 
As notecl in Porshee: 
There are two exceptions to the general 
privileqP of nondisclosure of an 
infonner's identity. Disclosure is 
requirecl ( 1) when the infonner's iclentity 
is alreacly known, and (2) when disclosure 
is essential "to assure a fair 
determination of the issues." 
!ill P.2d 124 (footnote oriitted). That case also recognized 
tl1P general rule that "an infonner who was a witness to the 
crime with which the accuserl was chargerl or who was an actual 
r·,fft icipant in the comriission of the alleged cririe is suhject 
t(1 an order of disclosure." fill P.2d at 1225 (citations 
.l\ppel lants rPly most heavily on this latter rule, 
cu1;111r1•1 that thPir rN1uest for rlisclosure shoulrl have been 
I' t 11,--il ly t , ik dr1 A('t iv~' part in the crime. However, the 
-7-
with which appPllants were charqerl. .../1 t 
burglary anrl theft ar-1sinr1 out ,,f the· hll-·JLlly ·I i'1 -1,,11 
Thorr1pson's resirlt>nc~, an in\:irlent thi:> infc•rrr1,1nt '11,1 r1,d 
witnP-ss or participate in; lhe'/ v.rt~rr-> n,)t_ ) I ' l t j l ' ( ] ,,.; i 1 ~ l (l Tl '1' 
crimes as a result of their sale qf Th"mpsnn' s \'r'R tn 
Detective Pirraglio, a transaction arl'nitterlly witnessed -in-1 
participaterl in hy the informant. Thr~refore, disclosure WdS 
not required on the grounrl presentPrl hy appellants. 
Morf'over, i'!S in Forshee, it appears appellants knec-1 
the idPntity of the informant, anrl thus the court's failun· t 
require disclosure, if error, is at hest harmless error. 
Detective Pirraglio's tPstimony at trial marle clPar that the 
informant knew appPllants anrl that they knf'w him, that the 
informant personally marle the arrangPments with appellants f·--r 
the sale of the VCR, that Pirraglio's meeting with appellant' 
was at the informant's apartment, and that the informant .vas 
the only other person present when the VCR was solrl. Fr nm 
that alone, the irlent ity of the informant must hcivrc been 
obvious. Further support for the conclusion that appellants 
knew the informants' S iclent ity is founrl at raqe R7 of thP 
trial transcript where the following exchanqP hetwePn ~r. 
Brown (Chamhers's couns0l) anrl PirralJlin is recnrrlc-d: 
-R-
o. r11d t hr· ('<ir1f i.Jent ial infrirrnant ever 
tPll yc,u f1is n.=:illle? 
,;. Nr,v<'-'r t.-il<i rnr-> his na 1nP. 
1\. r,nl 1/ his first narne. 
n. I t ' s t rue , is i t n nt , that h is f i rs t 
name is p,()h: 
A. That's true 
o. You rlirln't inquire as to his last 
name? 
A. rlirln't at the time, no. 
Finally, it appears appellants rnarle no attempt to subpoena the 
informant for the purpose of testifying. Thus, unrler these 
,-ircurnstances, if any error were cornrnitted by the trial court, 
it was not prejurlicial. 
POINT III 
UTAH com:: ANN. ~ 7n-6-402(1) (lq78) ANf' 
THP. TRIAL COIJRT' S INSTRllCTION RASEf' ON 
THAT STATllTP. ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY SOIJND. 
Appellants contenrl that lltah Corle Ann. 
7fl-n-4n2( 1) ( lq7K), which proviries that "[pl ossession of 
r1rnpe1-ty recently stolen, when no satisfactory exrlanation of 
such [><lSsession is marle, shall he rleernerl prirna facie evirlence 
th,H the person in possession stole the property," is 
llt1•·nnstitutional nn its fnce rx•cause it renalizes a rlefenrlant 
f r • r • • ,-.: f-' i- (' i c; i n r1 h i _s 1 ( i n c; t i t u t i () n '-, l r i q h t t n re rn n i n s i 1 en t ( see 
_q_ 
Appellant's Rrief at p.7). 
support of this position. 
However, they ci t_p nn ,~1utl~nri ty 1 
It appears thcit RarnPs v. 11n i terl ~tcitPs, 4 l) 11. "· 
837 (lq73), is dispositive of the issuP raise>d r1y ci1•1wl l'1nt 
There the Court rleterminerl thcit the fol lnwinci iury instruct 1, 
was constitutional: "Possession of recently stolen propPrt;, 
if not satisfactorily explained, is orrlinarily a circumstance 
from which you may reasonably draw the infPrence anrl finrl, in 
the light of the surrounrling circurnstcinces shown hy the 
evidence in the case, that the person in possession knew the 
property harl been stolen." The Court held thcit the 
traditional common law inference that guilty knowlerlge may he 
drawn from the fact of unexpla inecl possession of stolen goods 
satisfied clue process standards. In short, "[s] ince the 
inference . sat is fies the reasoncihle rlouht stanclard, the 
most stringent standard the Court has applied in juclging 
permissive criminal law inferences, it sat isfiPs the 
requirements of clue process." Rarnes, 412 U.S. cit R4fi. The 
Court also reaffirmed its prior rulings that thP inferPnCP 
does not infringe upon a defendant's privilege against 
self-incrimination. I cl. 11nc1er the Rarnes analysis, 
<;; 76-fi-402, which contains language very similar to that nf 
the instruction addressec1 in Parnes, does not pencilizP il 
defendant for exercising his right to remain silPnt anrl 1 
therefore not unconstitutional on its facP. 
-in-
Finnl ly, the f\arnes Court noterl that the instruction 
111nrit ''' hi-' fnirly underst•Jnd as a comment on the pPtitioner's 
l ] 11 r1' t ( J t f•S t j f ':/ • 1 11 41? 11.c;. at P.4fi n. 12, citing IJniteri 
Accorriingly, 
ap1•<>l lnnt Chnmhers's argument that Instruction No. lR (P. 
J4S)l, which incorporaterl the languac~e of<:; 7fi-fi-402(1), 
improrerly commenterl on his failure to testify is without 
merit. The conclusion of Gainey can logically he extenrlerl to 
rlPfeat Chambers's arlrlitional nrgument that the instruction 
improperly comments on his post-arrest silence. His citations 
tn State v. Wiswell, !Jtah f)39 P.2rl 14fi ( 1981), anrl Doyle v. 
Ohio, 42fi U.S. filO (197fi), are inapposite to the issue he 
raises here. 
POINT IV 
TF-IP ,JURY INSTRllCTION THAT POSSESSION OF 
PROPERTY RECENTLY STOLEN, WHFN NO 
SATISFACTORY RXPLANATION OF SlJCH 
POSSESSION IS MADE, SHALL RP DEPMPD PRIMA 
FACIE PVIDPNCP THAT THE PERSON IN 
POSSPSSION STOLE THE PROPERTY, DID NOT 
SHI FT TF-IP RURDPN OF PER.SlJASION TO 
APPELLANTS, NOR DID IT CREATE AN 
IR RERIJTTA RLF' PRESIJMPTI ON. 
Jury Instruct ion No. lR ( R. 14S) rearls: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorizerl control over the 
property nf another with a purpose to 
rlerrive him thereof. 
y--1\lthnu•jh the jury instruct ions cnntainerl in the recnrrl 
1r1· nnt rl0siqn.?1t\-'rl toy nlH'dH-'r, it a11rPars that appellants' 
l 1'tc'r•'rt<'1• tri '',Tury Ir1str11ct inn Nci. lR'' is ref Prence to the 
1 r1<-;t }-lJ,_'t i(1n d t P. 14 ci. 
-1 1-
Possession of propPrty rt'c•~ntly st<ilt>n, 
when nn sat isfcictnry exp1,::in,::::it inn r1f s1i(-h 
possession is rn,1rl.e,sh,-:il l hP 1h'1';-"1>fl i11~1111.-1 
facie evirlenC'~:" th;::it the lH--'rS 1 1r1 ir1 
possess inn st"l" the prc,pc>t-t y. 
Appellants contenrl this instrurt i0n rn-",-:itt'S ,-:in ir1-et1t1t t ,-d·lf 
presumption nf guilt and iri[>ennissitily sh1ftt''l ttw "Lur•l.-11 
(Appellants' RriPf at p.Cl). Although appellants refPr to 
shifting of the burrlen to go forwarrl with evirlence, their 
reliance on sanristrom v. Montana, 442 11.s. ')10 ( l'l7q), anrl 
State V. Walton, lltah, fi4f, P. 2rl Fd1C) ( lC\R2), sugcjests that the, 
are actually arguing that the instruction impermissihly 
shifted the burrlen of persuasion. This latter arguPlent c;nn 
the one relating to creation of an irrebuttable presumption 
were rejPcted by this Court in State v. Asay, IJtah, f;:Jl P.7r1 
8f>l (lC)Rl): 
WhilP the burrlen of persuasion may not 
be shifted to the defenrlant, to suggest 
that either the instruction given or the 
statute which supports it does so, is to 
misconstrue the nature of the statute's 
application. Under the statute, proof of 
possession of recently stolen property hy 
defendant constitutes only prima facie 
evidence of a further Plement of the 
alleged offense, i.e., the identity of 
rlefendant as the thief. "Prima facie 
evidence" is commonly rlef ined as " [ s I uch 
evirlence ilS, in the jurlgment of thP la'w is 
sufficient to establish a yiven fact, or 
the group or chain of facts constituting 
the party's claim or rlepose, anrl whirh if 
not rebutterl or contrarlicterl, will rerna1n 
sufficient," or m<)rc simply .::i~, n 
uSufficiPncy Of (-'VidenCP tr\ q(\ tn !ht' 
jury." Thus, in thP c:"ls~· ,-'lt h:1nd, a 
-1 7-
shr,·.vinq l1y the> state> that rlefenrlant was in 
rin~,c;p~.~inn 11f- thP CTUt()fll()hi:e, COUp}Pri with 
:1n 11r1c;,1t isfric'trJry F~xr1lcination 0f such 
l''JSSPc:;si()n, ic; suffirient, without rnore, 
t .• d<·f.,cit ,1 r·!.1irn thrit the state failed as 
,1 rndt tc'l. r 1f J,,,, tn est ahl ish defenclant' s 
i<kntity ,1s H1» thi•~f. The stcitute rloes 
nrit ()P''--'r,1tP to creat0 a presurnpt ion, 
[lf->rrn1ssiv0 nr nthPrwist?, re<Jarding the 
credihility "r weight of the evidence sn 
CrPciterl; such lies within the province of 
the jury. The instruction aclequately 
cnmmuniccites this by pointing out that, 
upon finding that defendant had possession 
of the ciutnmnhi le, ancl that his 
explanation therefor was unsatisfactory, 
that the jury may regard defendant as the 
guilty person. We therefore find no error 
in the instruct ion as given. 
id] P.2rl cit RF>3-R(;4 • 
. Accorclingly, Instruction No. 18, which recites 
verhatim (; 7F>-F>-4n2(1), dirl not, as appellants argue, violate 
the presumpt inn of innocence which cloaks all criminal 
rlefenrlant s or impermissihly shift the hurclen of persuasion to 
"f'P"llants. 
POINT V 
THE:PF WA.S SIWFICIFNT FVIDFNCF TO SlJPPORT 
APPE:LLANTS' CONVICTIONS. 
Appellants contend that because there was no direct 
,,·;j<J,,nce putting thePl in c;ummit County at the time of the 
···•mmission of thro crime with which they were chargecl, couplecl 
,11th thP 11nrehuttc•d alir·i r>virience presenti'd at trial, the 
1 v'l 1lf'l11_'1 w,==i·:::. ir1:=-t1ffi lt r1t t'• S\J['i111rt tht::..ir- convictions. When 
·I. +.d..,,1d . ..; ,,.,.,. ;.,,,,..,.,,_,,,.;;c;;;;ldy ,cl;.++-<..~ huclcA ei[ persoasiu11@ 
11' 11Jf· r1 Tl(J (1r1 i nstif f i 1_~il-'rJ('Y 0f ev id~"nCP cla IfTI, th is Court h.::is 
- I 1-
This Court wi11 ri11t 1iq 1-1tly 11\'1•tturr1 t)P 
finrlings nf ,1 jt1ry. t\1e rnust viPW t f11• 
evidence prnperly pr·csented cit t ri ii in 
the light rnnst fC1''11r:1:111' t11 th~, Jut'/' s 
verdict, anri will nnly interfer•· .v'ic·n the 
evidPnce is so lack1ncJ dn1i ]nstir•st,=int inl 
that a reasunahle rian coulc1 not pnssildy 
have rF>acherl a ver-1 i ct heynn(4 n rr:>a.snna~ 1P 
rioubt. St<ete v. Asay, 11taf-i, G31 P.7d HG! 
(lgRl); State v Lariri, rrtah, linli P.2-4 /2q 
(lg so); State v. Gorl ick, rrtah, GOS P. )cl 
7 I) l ( lg 7 CJ ) ; St ate v • L O<J an , 11 t ah , 5 f; 3 P. 2 d 
flll (1977). Ive also view in a liqht '"ost 
favorable to tt1e jury's verdict thnse 
facts which can he reasonably inferreri 
frori the eviclence presC>nteri tn it. 
State v. McCarclell, !Jtah, i;52 P.2<1 'l42, q4s (lg82) 
"Circumstantial evidence alone may he cnmpetent tn establish 
the guilt of the accused." State v. Clayton, IJtah, li41' P.7d 
723, 725 (lqR2). 
The state presenteri evirience estahlishin<J that 
appellants sold Richarcl Thompson's VCR unit to Dectective 
Pirraglio, anri that Richarcl Thrnnrson' s pistol anrl cowboy tv'"''' 
were discovered in a search of appellant Chambers's home. ~:i 
those items had heen recently stolen from Thompson's 
residence. Although appellilnts presenterl some evic10nce in,-
attempt to explilin their possession of those recently st"l•"' 
items (See T. 157-158, lqfl-2n21, the credibility nt th.1t 
evirlencP was sPriously unrlerrninPrl on crnss-f:-'xaniinatinn (c;1 
l1'2-ln7, ?2n-23RI. 
AciJTlittPrlly, the prUSPClJtinn w.=:is .-'lirlPd r1y tht· 
permissive presumpti(Hl !-~r-nvidcrl in 1· 1 h-h---lfl/(ll, 1,.,!l1i(~h 
- 1 4-
tri >lit ;l 11-'/ ,.,·r~ 1 State v. Sessions, 
~ ~ l . / j ·l .+ , 
As noted in Sessions: 
[p]nssrssion nf articles recently stolen, 
when co1irlt'rl with cirrumstances 
i nrnns istt"nt •,.;i th innncP nee, such as 
making a fdlse or improhahle or 
unsatisfactory explanation of the 
P"c;session, may be sufficient to connect 
the ross0c;sor with the nffense of hur<Jlciry 
and justify his conviction of it. 
SH\ P.2d at 4fi, quoting State v. Thomas, 121 lltah fi39, fi41, 
Finally, appellants' claim that thcdr unrehutted 
alihi evidenre further compels a finding that the evidence was 
insufficient to support their convictions, is without merit. 
~1rst, the alibi evidence in no way conclusively established 
that appellants were not or could not have been at Richard 
Thr,r'pson's n-'sirlence in Summit County rluring the period in 
which the crime occurred (see T. l'in-157, 175-179). It 
r,,nsistF'rl nf little more than testimony from appellant 
ch"mber's wif0 and James Wilcox that Chambers spent some time 
in th0 hospitcil in the ecirly part of ,"January, l9R:J, that 
'r11r11'-, .-it \"1i'J]1'riY'c, t·,,~;i11Prl\'t~ 1n C't-irly .1anuriry. 
- 1 5-
Moreover, a jury is nnt rt-•quirr-'>d t(' 
testimony even though not contrnrlicte,1 h\' ,,trwr .-11t'" 
ev ide nee. State v. Polanrl, 112 ,l\riz. ~r,ci, r,4'i P. J,1 'H,1, 
(1982); State v. Darrah, 415 P.2rl g14, 41R I lqnR). Th is 1 c: 
consistent with this Court's statement in State v. Howell, 
Utah, 649 P. 2d ql, 97 ( lqR2), that the trier of fiict is ,,, 1 
ohligaterl to believe the evirlence mnst favorable to the 
defendant rather than that presented in opposition hy the 
state. 
Because the evidence ilrlrluced at trial, viewerl in t'.-
light most favorable to the verdict, was not so lacking ~n4 
insubstantial that the jury must have entertained a reasnnahle 
doubt that appellants were guilty of the offensces with whic 1 
they were chargerl, appellants' insufficiency of evirlence clci-
should he rejected anrl their convictions affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the jurlgments and the 
sentences of the trial 
RESPr~CTFllLLY 
court shoulrl he af firmerl. 
submitted this 2___-flt"day of May, 
DA\/Ill L. WILKT'IS()'i 
Attorney General 
=;5-MX- 13 ~- , - - -
DAVE H. Tfl0'1PS;;vcu r~n,_ 
Assistant Att,irnPy r;erwr;l 
I:, i ! J< 
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Tl! F .\TTOH:-\FY (;F:-\ER.\L 
:--T.\TL nr f'T:\11 
I >.\\'/fl /. 11·11 hf\:-,r >\ 
May 8, 1985 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: State v. Chambers. Stanley Ned Jacobsen. 
and J. D. <last name unknown), No. 19151 
and No. 19152 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
or_;: \l'.~ "-~:J:;L_E.~1~~~=-' -Hsi~'.' 
'-TF!-'H!- '\ I. 
f· .-\}(! I- DOH!I '- r HIEP 
'_3c;,1;"' ., •.' 'o 1.a,, -~ =. ··~·c· 
I have attached a copy of Massachusetts y. Upton, __ 
u.s. __ , 104 s.ct. 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984), as supplemental 
authority that is supportive of the State's argument in Point I 
of its brief in State y, Chambers. et al. 
This supplemental authority is submitted pursuant to 
Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1985). 
Sincerely, 
=;7(;-CU/-t_ JS. ~~ 
DAVE B. THOMPSON (/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
IJP.'I' iTlfll 
Kenneth R. Brown 
J. Bruce Savage, Jr. 
~\I I I \ h I < I I\ I I \ 11 !'.I I 1 ! I I I I I 'I I (I'\. l H( J 1 -.-,:;.""'1-:"">:..!(\ I 
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MASSACHUSETTS, Petitioner 
v 
GEORGE UPTON 
- US-, 80 L Ed 2d 721, 104 S Ct-
[No. 83-1338] 
Decided May 14, 1984 
Decision: "Totality of circumstances" held proper standard for determining 
probable cause for issuance of search warrant based on information from 
informant. 
SUMMARY 
Evidence discovered through a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, 
for which probable cause was established to the satisfaction of the issuing 
magistrate on the basis of a police officer's affidavit recounting an infor-
mant's tip as to the location of stolen property, led to the conviction of a 
defendant on multiple counts of burglary, receiving stolen property, and 
related crimes. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
reversed the defendant's convictions, holding that the warrant violated the 
Fourth Amendment because the affidavit supporting the warrant did not 
satisfy the "two-pronged test" requiring an affiant to reveal an informant's 
"basis of knowledge" and to provide facts establishing either the general 
"veracity" of the informant or the speci£c "reliability" of his report in the 
particular case, and because there was insufficient corroboration of the 
informant's tip to make up for the failure to satisfy the two-pronged test. 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 
In a per curiam opinion expressing the views of BURGER, Ch. J., and WHITE, 
BLACKMUN, PowELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CoNNOR, JJ., it was held that the 
Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a 
warrant is to be applied, not according to the rigid "two-pronged test," but 
rather in the light of the "totality of the circumstances" made known to the 
issuing magistrate, and that, examined in this light, the police officer's 
affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable 
cause for the issuance of the warrant 
721 
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STEVENS, J concurred in the judgment, expressing the view that the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts should have first determined 
whether the warrant was valid as a matter of Massachusetts law before 
deciding the federal constitutional question. 
BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., dissented from the summary disposition of 
the case and would have denied the petition for certiorari. 
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HEADNOTES 
Classified to U.S Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers' Edition 
Search and Seizure § 27 - war- rigid formula, is the proper standard 
rant - probable cause - in- for determining probable cause un-
formant's tip der the Fourth Amendment for the 
la, lb. The "totality of the circum- issuance of a search warrant based 
stances," rather than a fixed and on information from an informant. 
TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY~ REFERENCES 
68 Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures§ 65 
8 Federal Procedure, L Ed, Criminal Procedure §§ 22:126--
22:13 
7 Federal Procedural Forms, L Ed, Criminal Procedure 
§§ 20:497' 20:499 
22 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev), Searches and Seizures, 
Forms 3, 21, 53 
33 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d 549, Criminal Law: Need for 
Disclosure of Identity of Informant 
5 Am Jur Trials 331, Excluding Illegally Obtained Evidence 
USCS, Constitution, Fourth Amendment 
US L Ed Digest, Search and Seizure § 27 
L Ed Index to Annas, Affidavits; Informer; Magistrate; Proba-
ble Cause; Search and Seizure 
ALR Quick Index, Affidavits; Criminal Law; Informers; Magis-
trate; Probable Cause; Search and Seizure 
Federal Quick Index, Affidavits; Criminal Law; Informers; 
Magistrates; Probable Cause; Search and Seizure 
Auto-Cite.., Any case citation herein can be checked for 
form, parallel references, later history and annotation ref-
erences through the Auto-Cite computer research system . 
ANNOTATION REFERENCES 
Federal court determination of probable cause for search warrant: 
consideration of oral testimony which was, in addition to affidavit, before 
officer who issued warrant 24 ALR Fed 107. 
Disputation of truth of matters stated in affidavit in support of search 
warrant-modem cases. 24 ALR4th 1266. 
Sufficiency of affidavit for search warrant based on affiant's belie!, 
based in turn on information, investigation, etc., by one whose name lS 
not disclosed. 14 ALR2d 605 
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Search and Seizure § 27 - war-
rant - probable cause - def-
erence to magistrate's deci-
sion 
2a, 2b Deference should be 
granted to a magtstrate's decision to 
issue a search warrant, and a re-
viewing court should merely decide 
whether the evidence viewed as a 
whole provided a "substantial basis" 
for the magistrate's finding of proba-
ble cause as required by the Fourth 
Amendment, rather than conduct a 
de novo probable cause determina-
tion. 
Search and Seizure § 27 - war-
rant - probable cause - in-
formant's tip 
3. A police officer's affidavit de-
scribing a conversation with an in-
formant provides a substantial basis 
for the issuance of a search warrant 
where, though no single piece of 
evidence in it is conclusive, the 
pieces fit neatly together, and, so 
viewed, support the issuing magis-
trate's determination that there is a 
fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of crime will be found at 
the location described by the infor-
mant. 
Search and Seizure § 27 - war-
rant - probable cause -
marginal cases 
4. Although in a particular case it 
may not be easy to determine when 
an affidavit demonstrates the exis-
tence of probable cause for the issu-
ance of a warrant, the resolution of 
doubtful or marginal cases in this 
area should be largely determined 
by the preference to be accorded 
warrants 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
Per Curiam. 
(la, 2a] Last Term, in Illinois v 
Gates, 76 L Ed 2d 527, 103 S Ct 2317 
<19831, we held that the Fourth 
Amendment's requirement of proba-
ble cause for the issuance of a war-
rant is to be applied, not according 
to a fixed and rigid formula, but 
rather in the light of the "totality of 
the circumstances" made known to 
the magistrate We also emphasized 
that the task of a reviewing court is 
not to conduct a de nova determina-
tion of probable cause, but only to 
determine whether there is substan-
tial evidence in the record support-
ing the magistrate's decision to issue 
the warrant In this case, the Su-
premp Judicial Court of Massachu-
sHt'. interpreting the probabk 
caUSl' re4u1rement of tht' Fourth 
Amt->ndm('nt to tht-' llnited State~ 
('onst1tut10n. continued to rt'ly on 
724 
the approach set forth in cases such 
as Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108, 12 L 
Ed 2d 723, 84 S Ct 1509 (1964), and 
Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410, 
21 L Ed 2d 637, 89 S Ct 584 (1969J. 
Since this approach was rejected in 
Gates, we grant the petition for cer-
tiorari in this case and reverse the 
judgment of the Supreme Judicial 
Court. 
At noon on September 11, 1980, 
Lt. Beland of the Yarmouth Police 
Department assisted in the execu-
tion of a search warrant for a motel 
room reserved by one Richard Kel-
leher at the Snug Harbor Motel in 
West Yarmouth. The search pro-
duced several items of identification, 
including credit cards, belonging to 
two persons whose homes had re-
centiY been burglarized. Other items 
take~ m the burglaries, such as jew-
elry, silver and gold, were not found 
at the motel 
• 
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At 3.20 p. m. on the same day, Lt. 
Beland received a call from an uni-
dentified female who told him that 
there was "a motor home full of 
stolen stuff' parked behind # 5 Jef-
ferson Ave., the home of respondent 
George Upton and his mother. She 
stated that the stolen items included 
jewelry, silver and gold. As set out 
in Lt. Beland's affidavit in support of 
a search warrant: 
"She further stated that George 
Upton was going to move the mo-
tor h0me any time now because of 
the fact that Ricky Kelleher's mo-
tel room was raided and that 
George Upton had purchased 
these stolen items from Ricky Kel-
leher. This unidentified female 
stated that she had seen the stolen 
items but refused to identify her-
self because 'he'll kill me,' refer-
ring to George Upton. I then told 
this unidentified female that I 
knew who she was, giving her the 
name of Lynn Alberico, who I had 
met on May 16, 1980, at George 
Upton's repair shop off Summer 
St., in Yarmouthport. She was 
identified to me by George Upton 
as being his girlfriend, Lynn Al-
berico. The unidentified female ad-
mitted that she was the girl that I 
had named, stating that she was 
surprised that I knew who she 
was She then told me that she'd 
broken up with George Upton and 
wanted to bum him. She also told 
me that she wouldn't give me her 
address or phone number but that 
she would contact me in the fu-
ture, if need be." See 390 Mass, at 
564 n 2. 
Following the phone call, Lt. Be-
land went to Upton's house to verify 
that a moto~ home was parked on 
the property. Then, while other offi-
cers watched the premisEs, Lt Be-
land prepared the application for a 
search warrant, setting out all the 
information noted above in an ac-
companying affidavit. He also at-
tached the police reports on the two 
prior burglaries, along with lists of 
the stolen property. A magistrate 
issued the warrant, and a subse-
quent search of the motor home pro-
d uced the items described by the 
caller and other incriminating evi-
dence. The discovered evidence led 
to Upton's conviction on multiple 
counts of burglary, receiving stolen 
property, and related crimes. 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial 
Court, respondent argued that the 
search warrant was not supported 
by a sufficient showing of "probable 
cause" under the Fourth Amend-
ment. With respect to our Gates 
opinion, that court said: 
"It is not clear that the Gates 
opinion has announced a signifi-
cant change in the appropriate 
Fourth Amendment treatment of 
applications for search warrants. 
Looking at what the Court did on 
the facts before it, and rejecting 
an expansive view of certain gen-
eral statements not essential to 
the decision, we conclude that the 
Gates opinion deals principally 
with what corroboration of an in-
formant's tip, not adequate by it-
self will be sufficient to meet 
probable cause standards." 390 
Mass, at 568. 
Prior to Gates, the Fourth Amend-
ment was understood by many 
courts to require strict satisfaction 
of a "two-pronged test" whenever an 
affidavit supporting the issuance of a 
search warrant relies on an infor-
mant's tip. It was thought that the 
affidavit, first, must establish the 
725 
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"basis of knowledge" of the infor-
mant-the particular means by 
which he came by the information 
given in his report; and, second, that 
it must provide facts establishing 
either the general "veracity" of the 
informant or the specific "reliabil-
ity" of his report in the particular 
case. The Massachusetts court ap-
parently viewed Gates as merely 
adding a new wrinkle to this two-
pronged test: where an informant's 
veracity and/or basis of knowledge 
are not sufficiently clear, substantial 
corroboration of the tip may save an 
otherwise invalid warrant. 
"We do not view the Gates opinion 
as decreeing a standardless 'total-
ity of the circumstances' test. The 
informant's veracity and the basis 
of his knowledge are still impor-
tant but, where the tip is ade-
quately corroborated, they are not 
elements indispensible [sic] to a 
finding of probable cause. It seems 
that, in a given case, the corrobo-
ration may be so strong as to sat-
isfy probable cause in the absence 
of any other showing of the infor-
mant's 'veracity' and any direct 
statement of the 'basis of [his] 
knowledge.'" Ibid. 
Turning to the facts of this case, 
the Massachusetts court reasoned, 
first, that the basis of the infor-
mant's knowledge was not "force-
fully apparent" in the affidavit. Id., 
at 569. Although the caller stated 
that she had seen the stolen items 
and that they were in the motor 
home. she did not specifically state 
that she saw them in the motor 
home Second, the court concluded 
that "[n]one of the common bases for 
determining the credibility of an in-
formant or the reliability of her in-
furmat ion is present here." Ibid The 
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caller was not a "tried and true" 
informant, her statement was not 
against penal interest, and she was 
not an "ordinary citizen" providing 
information as a witness to a crime. 
"She was an anonymous informant, 
and her unverified assent to the sug-
gestion that she was Lynn Alberico 
does not take her out of that cate-
gory." Id., at 570. 
Finally, the court felt that there 
was insufficient corroboration of the 
informant's tip to make up for its 
failure to satisfy the two-pronged 
test. The facts that tended to corrob-
orate the informant's story were 
that the motor home was where it 
was supposed to be, that the caller 
knew of the motel raid which took 
place only three hours earlier, and 
that the caller knew the name of 
Upton and his girlfriend. But, much 
as the Supreme Court of Illinois did 
in the opinion we reviewed in Gates, 
supra, the Massachusetts court rea-
soned that each item of corrobora-
tive evidence either related to inno-
cent, nonsuspicious conduct or re-
lated to an event that took place in 
public. To sustain the warrant, the 
court concluded, more substantial 
corroboration was needed. The court 
therefore held that the warrant vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and re-
versed respondent's convictions. 
[1b] We think that the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts mis-
understood our decision in Gates. 
We did not merely refine or qualify 
the "two-pronged test." We rejected 
it as hypertechnical and divorced 
from "the factual and practical con-
siderations of everday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not 
legal technicians. act." Brinegar v 
United States, 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 
1879, 69 S Ct 1302 119491 Our state-
' 
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ment on that score was explicit 
"[W]<> conclude that it is wiser to 
abandon the 'two-pronged test' estab-
lished by our decisions in Aguilar 
and Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm 
the totality of the circumstances 
analysis that traditionally has in-
formed probable cause determina-
tions." Gates, supra, at 2332, 76 L 
Ed 2d 527. This "totality of the cir-
cumstances" analysis is more in 
keeping with the "practical, com-
mon-sense decision" demanded of 
the magistrate. Ibid. 
We noted in Gates that "the 'two-
pronged test' has encouraged an ex-
cessively technical dissection of in-
formants' tips, with undue attention 
being focused on isolated issues that 
cannot sensibly be divorced from the 
other facts presented to the magis-
trate." Id., at 2330, 76 L Ed 2d 527. 
This, we think, is the error of the 
Massachusetts court in this case. 
The court did not consider Lt. Be-
land's affidavit in its entirety, giving 
significance to each relevant piece of 
information and balancing the rela-
tive weights of all the various indi-
cia of reliability (and unreliability) 
attending the tip. Instead, the court 
insisted on judging bits and pieces of 
information in isolation against the 
artificial standards provided by the 
two-pronged test. 
[2b] The Supreme Judicial Court 
also erred in failing to grant any 
deference to the decision of the mag-
istrate to issue a warrant. Instead of 
• "If the affida"<1ts submitted by police offi-
cers are subJected to the type of scrutiny some 
courts have deemed appropnate, police might 
well resort to warrantless searches, with the 
hope of relying on consent or some other 
exception to the warrant clause that might 
develop at the time of the search In addition, 
the possession of a warrant by officers con· 
ducting an arrest or search grea!ly reduces 
merely deciding whether the evi-
dence viewed as a whole provided a 
"substantial basis" for the magis-
trate's finding of probable cause, the 
court c-0nducted a de novo probable 
cause determination. We rejected 
just such after-the-fact, de novo scru-
tiny in Gates. 103 S Ct, at 2331, 76 L 
Ed 2d 527. "A grudging or negative 
attitude by reviewing courts toward 
warrants," United States v Ven-
tresca, 380 US 102, 13 L Ed 2d 684, 
85 S Ct 741 (19651, is inconsistent 
b-Oth with the desire to encourage 
use of the warrant process by police 
officers and with the recognition 
that once a warrant has been ob-
tained, intrusion upon interests pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment is 
less severe than otherwise may be 
the case. Gates, supra, at 2331 n 10, 
76 L Ed 2d 527." A deferential stan-
dard of review is appropriate to fur-
ther the Fourth Amendment's 
strong preference for searches con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant. 
[3] Examined in light of Gates, Lt. 
Beland's affidavit provides a substan-
tial basis for the issuance of the 
warrant. No single piece of evidence 
in it is conclusive. But the pieces fit 
neatly together and, so viewed, sup-
port the magistrate's determination 
that there was "a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of 
crime" would be found in Upton's 
motor home. Id., at 2332, 76 L Ed 2d 
527. The informant claimed to have 
seen the stolen goods and gave a 
description of them which tallied 
the perception of unla.,..ful or intrusive police 
conduct, by assuring 'the individual whose 
property is searched or seized of the lawful 
authority of the executing officer, his need ~ 
search, and the limits of hJ.S power to search 
United States v Chadwick, 433 US l, 8 (53 L 
Ed 2d 538. 97 S Ct 2476) t1977J" Gates. supra. 
at 2331, 76 L Ed 2d 527 
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with the items taken in recent bur-
glaries She knew of the raid on the 
motel room-which produced evi-
dence connected to those burglaries 
-and that the room had been re-
served by Kelleher. She explained 
the connection between Kelleher's 
motel room and the stolen goods in 
Upton's motor home. And she pro-
vided a motive both for her attempt 
at anonymity-fear of Upton's retal-
iation-and for furnishing the infor-
mation-her recent breakup with 
Upton and her desire "to burn him." 
The Massachusetts court dismissed 
Lt. Beland's identification of the 
caller as a mere "unconfirmed 
guess." 390 Mass, at 569 n 6. But 
"probable cause does not demand 
the certainty we associate with for-
mal trials." Gates, supra, at 2336, 76 
L Ed 2d 527. Lt. Beland noted that 
the caller "admitted that she was 
the girl I had named, stating that 
she was surprised that I knew who 
she was." It is of course possible that 
the caller merely adopted Lt. Be-
land's suggestion as "a convenient 
cover for her true identity." 390 
Mass, at 570. But given the caller's 
admission, her obvious knowledge of 
who Alberico was and how she was 
connected with Upton, and her ex-
planation of her motive in calling, 
Lt. Beland's inference appears 
stronger than a mere uninformed 
and unconfirmed guess. It is enough 
that the inference was a reasonable 
one and conformed with the other 
pieces of evidence making up the 
total showing of probable cause. 
(4) In concluding that there was 
probable cause for the issuance of 
this warrant, the magistrate can 
hardly be accused of approving a 
mere "hunch" or a bare recital of 
legal conclusions. The informant's 
story and the surrounding facts pos-
sessed an internal coherence that 
gave weight to the whole. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the informa-
tion contained in Lt. Beland's affida-
vit provided a sufficient basis for the 
"practical, common-sense decision" 
of the magistrate. "Although in a 
particular case it may not be easy to 
determine when an affidavit demon-
strates the existence of probable 
cause, the resolution of doubtful or 
marginal cases in this area should 
be largely determined by the prefer-
ence to be accorded warrants." 
United States v Ventresca, 380 US 
102, 109, 13 L Ed 2d 684, 85 S Ct 
741 (1965). 
The judgment of the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
SEPARATE OPINION 
Justice Stevens, concurring in the 
judgment. 
In my opinion the judgment of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts reflects an error of a more 
fundamental character than the one 
I. Indeed, that court rather pomtl'dly re-
fu~ t.o consider .,., hetheT the sParch violated 
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this Court corrects today. It rested 
its decision on the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitu-
tion without telling us whether the 
warrant was valid as a matter of 
Massachusetts law.' It has thereby 
increased its own burdens as well as 
the provisions of Art 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights It stated, in part· 
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ours For when the case returns to 
that court, it must then review the 
probable cause issue once again and 
decide whether or not a violation of 
the state constitutional protection 
against unreasonable searches and 
seizures has occurred. If such a vi~ 
lation did take place, much of that 
court's first opinion and all of this 
Court's opinion are for naught.' If no 
such violation occurred, the second 
proceeding in that court could have 
been avoided by a ruling w that 
effect when the case was there a 
year ago. 
If the magistrate had violated a 
state statute when he issued the 
warrant, surely the state supreme 
court would have so held and 
thereby avoided the necessity of de-
ciding a federal constitutional ques-
tion. I see no reason why it should 
not have followed the same sequence 
of analysis when an arguable viola-
tion of the state constitution is dis-
closed by the record. As the Oregon 
Supreme Court has stated: 
"The proper sequence is w analyze 
the state's law, including its con-
stitutional law, before reaching a 
federal constitutional claim. This 
is required, not for the sake either 
of parochialism or of style, but 
because the state does not deny 
"If we have correctly construed the signifi-
cance of Illinois v Gates, the Fourth Amend-
ment standards for determining probable 
cause to issue a search warrant have not been 
made so much less clear and so relaxed as to 
compel us to try our hand at a definition of 
standards under art 14 If we have misas-
sessed the consequences of the Gates opinion 
and 1n fact the Gates standard proves to be 
unacceptably shapeless and permissive, this 
court may have to define the protections guar-
anteed to the people against unreasonable 
Bf'arches and seizures bv ert 14, and the con-
Sf'"quences of the v1ola
0
t1on of those protec-
t10n~" App to Pet for Cert 31-32 
any right claimed under the fed-
eral Constitution when the claim 
before the court in fact is fully 
met by state law." Sterling v 
Cupp, 290 Or 611, 614, 625 P2d 
123, 126 (19831.' 
The maintenance of the proper 
balance between the respective juris-
dictions of state and federal courts is 
always a difficult task. In recent 
years I have been concerned by what 
I have regarded as an encroachment 
by this Court inw terriwry that 
should be reserved for state judges. 
See e. g., Michigan v Long, -- US 
-, 77 L Ed 2d 1201, 103 S Ct 3469 
(19831 (Stevens, J., dissenting); South 
Dakota v Neville, 459 US 553, 74 L 
Ed 2d 748, 103 S Ct 916 (1983) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Minnesota v 
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 US 
456, 477-489, 66 L Ed 2d 659, 101 S 
Ct 715 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissent. 
ingl; Idaho Department of Employ-
ment v Smith, 434 US 100, 103--105, 
54 L Ed 2d 324, 98 S Ct 327 (1977) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part). The 
maintenance of this balance is, how-
ever, a two way street. It is also 
important that state judges do not 
unnecessarily invite this Court w 
undertake review of state court judg-
ments. I believe the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts unwisely 
and unnecessarily invited just such 
2. Cf. South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 
364. 49 L Ed 2d 1000, 96 S Ct 3092 119761 
(rev'g 89 SD 25, 228 NW2d 152!, on remand, 
247 NW2d.673 09761 (judgment reinstated on 
state grounds!; South Dakota v Neville, 459 
US 553. 74 L Ed 2d 748, 103 S Ct 916 (19831 
(rev'g 312 NW2d 7231, on remand, - NW2d 
- tl984l (judgment reinstated on state 
groundsl 
3. See also State v Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 
666 P2d 1316 (19831, and cases cited therein, 
id. at 262. 666 P2d at 1318, Hewitt v SAIF, 
294 Or 33. 41-42. 653 P2d 970, 975 \19821 
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review in this case. Its judgment in 
this regard reflects a misconception 
of our constitutional heritage and 
the respective jurisdictions of state 
and federal courts. 
The absence of a Bill of Rights in 
the Constitution proposed by the 
Federal Constitutional Convention of 
1787 was a major objection to the 
Convention's proposal. See, e. g., 12 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 438 
(Boyd Ed 1958). In defense of the 
Convention's plan Alexander Hamil-
ton argued that the enumeration of 
certain rights was not only unneces-
sary, given that such rights had not 
been surrendered by the people in 
their grant of limited powers to the 
federal government, but "would even 
be dangerous" on the ground that 
enumerating certain rights could 
provide a "plausible pretense" for 
the government to claim powers not 
granted in derogation of the people's 
rights. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 
84, 573, 574 (Ford Ed 1898). The 
latter argument troubled the 1st 
Congress during their deliberations 
on the Bill of Rights, and their solu-
tion became the Ninth Amendment. 
See 1 Annals of Congress 439 (1789) 
<Remarks of Rep. Madison). 
The Ninth Amendment provides: 
"The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage oth-
ers retained by the people." To the 
extent that the Bill of Rights is ap-
plicable to the States under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the princi-
ple embodied in the Ninth Amend-
ment is applicable as well. The 
Ninth Amendment, it has been said. 
sU!tes but a truism But that truism 
goes to the very core of the constitu-
tional rPlationship between t~e indi-
v1fh1al and governmental authority, 
7:10 
and indeed, between sovereigns exer-
CIBing authority over the individual. 
In my view, the court below lost 
sight of this truism, and permitted 
the enumeration of certain rights in 
the Fourth Amendment to disparage 
the rights retained by the people of 
Massachusetts under Art 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
It is of course not my role to state 
what rights Art 14 confers upon the 
people of Massachusetts; under our 
system of federalism, only Massa-
chusetts can do that. The state court 
refused to perform that function, 
however, and instead strained to 
rest its judgment on federal constitu-
tional grounds. 
Whatever protections Art 14 does 
confer are surely disparaged when 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts refuses to adjudicate their 
very existence because of the enu-
meration of certain rights in the 
Constitution of the United States. 
The rights conferred by Art 14 may 
not only exceed the rights conferred 
by the Fourth Amendment as con-
strued by this Court in Gates, but 
indeed may exceed the rights con-
ferred by the Fourth Amendment as 
construed by the state court. The 
dissent followed the approach of the 
majority to its logical conclusion, 
stating that there "appears to be no 
logical basis, and no support in the 
case law, for interpreting the term 
'cause' in Art 14 differently from the 
'probable cause' requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment." Pet for Cert 
9a. "The right question," however, 
"is not whether a state's guarantee 
is the same as or broader than its 
federal counterpart as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court. The right 
question is what the state's guaran-
tee means and how it applies to the 
case at hand. The answer may turn 
t 
• 
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<;>ut the same as it would under fed-
eral law. The state law also may be 
less protective. In that case the 
court must go on to decide the claim 
under federal law, assuming it has 
been raised " Linde, E Pluribus-
Constitutional Theory and State 
Courts, 18 Ga L Rev 165, 179 (19841 
It must be remembered that for 
the first century of this nation's his-
tory, the Bill of Rights of the Consti-
tution of the United States was 
solely a protection for the individual 
in relation to federal authorities. 
State constitutions protected the lib-
erties of the people of the several 
States from abuse by state authori-
ties. The Bill of Rights is now 
largely applicable to state authori-
ties and is the ultimate guardian of 
individual rights. The States in our 
federal system, however, remain the 
primary guardian of the liberty of 
the people. The Massachusetts court, 
I believe, ignored this fundamental 
premise of our constitutional system 
of government. In doing so, it made 
an ill-advised entry into the federal 
domain. 
Accordingly, concur in the 
Court's judgment. 
Justice Brennan and Justice Mar-
shall dissent from the summary dis-
position of this case and would deny 
the petition for certiorari. 
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